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From a European Neighborhood Policy
toward a New Ostpolitik – The Potential
Impact of German Policy
Summary
The rainbow revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine drew inspiration from, and were
oriented toward, Western values and norms. One of the most important objectives
driving the new wave of post-Soviet transition has been the desire to join Euro-
Atlantic structures. The goal of becoming an EU member is no longer limited to
foreign policy declarations but forms a key component of the domestic reform
agendas of these states. The unexpected dynamism of democratization and reform
emerging from Eastern Europe has put pressure on Western policymakers to 
develop solutions that go beyond the agenda of an EU enlargement limited to 27
or 28 member states, partnership and cooperation with Russia, and a
Neighborhood Policy driven by “everything but institutions” (Romano Prodi). The
French and Dutch rejections of the European Constitution appear to signal that the 
“deepening”and “widening”of the EU have reached their limits for the time being.
The European Neighborhood Policy is an important step forward, but it is not suf-
ficient to guide democratic developments in countries that desire a concrete 
prospect for EU membership, including Ukraine, Georgia, and in the future even
Belarus.
Ukraine’s Orange Revolution once again demonstrated Putin’s failure to influence
the post-Soviet integration space through personal networks, direct pressure, and
economic dependency. At the same time, Russia remains an important actor in
Europe as a whole. For the first time, Russia and the EU face the common challen-
ge of shaping overlapping integration spaces between Russia’s old neighborhood
or “near abroad” and the EU’s new neighborhood. Eastern Europe’s “return to
Europe” has been driven by individual Eastern European states themselves,
together with some of the new EU member states, such as Poland, Lithuania and
Slovakia. But all of these efforts will be of limited relevance without support from
Berlin. Focusing on Germany’s potential role in elaborating and implementing a
new Ostpolitik raises key analytical questions: What is Germany’s potential impact
on a new Ostpolitik, and what German interests and actors would be involved? In
considering this new foreign policy agenda, one must focus on the current state of
affairs as well as on the strategic concepts that will shape future policy. This paper
examines the potential impact of German foreign policy toward Eastern Europe and
provides a critical assessment of other national and international actors involved.
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1. Germany’s Impact on a New Ostpolitik 
Berlin’s current obligations and interests in shaping relations with Eastern Europe
are strongly influenced by the legacies of World War II: these include in particular
the post-war existence of two German states; the geographic realties following
reunification that led Germany to become an important Central European player;
Germany’s economic position in the region; and, last but not least, the German
tradition of driving Eastern policy within Western alliances. Recent German
Eastern policy has been characterized by similarities with Willy Brandt’s historic
Ostpolitik, far-reaching but highly personalized relations with Soviet/Russian
heads of state, and leadership in the process of EU eastern enlargement.
A brief glimpse at history provides a key to understanding Germany’s current inte-
rest in Eastern policy. On December 7, 1970, former German chancellor Willy
Brandt’s famous Kniefall at the Warsaw Ghetto memorial not only symbolized the
first official apology for Nazi-era crimes, but also initiated a new period of recon-
nection and cooperation between Eastern and Western Europe. The goal of 1970s
Ostpolitik was to transcend but not to reverse the existing status quo between the
two German states, while giving up the goal of immediate reunification as a pre-
requisite to all other German-German policy decisions. Among the elements of
Brandt’s Ostpolitik were the abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine and the
recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the border between Poland and East
Germany.
Closer economic, cultural and social ties with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
formed an additional significant component of Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Western eco-
nomic assistance helped shore up faltering communist economies, but it also made
visible to Eastern European citizens the contrast between the wealth and high-
quality consumer goods of the West and the relative poverty of the East.
In 1970, the Treaty of Moscow was signed between West Germany and the Soviet
Union. Quickly thereafter, West Germany signed treaties with Poland (Treaty of
Warsaw, 1970) and other Eastern Bloc states. Among these treaties, the most
controversial agreement was the 1972 Basic Traety that established mutual recog-
nition between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic. Despite criticism that Brandt was being overhasty in recognizing the
Warsaw Pact countries, this new political strategy enhanced opportunities for co-
operation and understanding and created gaps in the Iron Certain by allowing
limited yet increasing people-to-people contacts. To this day, experts continue to
argue over the extent to which Brandt’s Ostpolitik contributed to the collapse of
the Soviet bloc.
After more than two decades of not pushing the issue, the question of German
reunification gained new relevance during Gorbachev’s term in office. In response
to democratic changes and the opening up of borders throughout East Central
Europe, including the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Gorbachev was initially skep-
tical toward German reunification but eventually supported the necessary political
arrangements. For its part, Germany – with the objective of German reunification,
its own economic interests, and common political goals in mind – provided $40.25
billion in support to the Russian Federation in 1990-1993. This made Germany the
largest international donor to the Russian Federation in both absolute and per
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Promoting EU enlargement
A ‘Russia first’ approach plus
the new neighborhood policy
capita terms (during the same period, the United States provided $11.8 billion,
Japan $4.6 billion, and the U.K. $1.04 billion in assistance).1
At the same time, Germany remained the driving force in bringing the Central
European states back to Europe. The German government played a central role in
pushing the EU enlargement process forward at the Copenhagen European
Council in 1993, when the EU decided that the associated countries in Central and
Eastern Europe would be offered membership in the European Union. As a result,
enlargement was no longer a question of if but when. Again, Germany succeeded
in combining three strategic objectives: maintaining good relations with the
Kremlin; playing a decisive role on behalf of Central European countries, particu-
larly Poland; and coordinating German initiatives with its European and trans-
atlantic partners.
In addition to Germany’s geographic position, historical development, and politi-
cal agenda, German Ostpolitik is also traditionally driven by economic interests.2
In 1980, Central European countries accounted for 4.9% of West Germany’s
exports and 4.6% of its imports. By 2003, these figures had increased to 12.1% and
14.3%, respectively. These figures were expected to increase in 2004 by 16.5% and
18.5%, respectively.3 Germany is also Russia’s most important trading partner,
with the volume of trade recording a considerable increase in 2004 (up 18.4% to
over EUR 31 billion). However, Russia’s share of German trade declined substan-
tially in 2004 and amounted to only 2.8% of German exports and 2% of German
imports.4 Bilateral economic relations between Russia and Germany are largely
asymmetric: Russia exports primarily raw materials and energy resources to
Germany, while German exports to Russia are comprised largely of finished pro-
ducts and capital goods.
To sum up Germany has entertained long-standing and multi-faceted relations
with the countries of Eastern Europe. These related interests and experiences have
also helped shape relations between the European Union and its Eastern neigh-
bors. Up to now, German foreign policy in this area has been driven by a combi-
nation of actors from the German Foreign Office and the Chancellor’s Office.
During the past decade, German chancellors have favored a “Russia first”approach
that has involved close personal relations between Helmut Kohl and Boris Yeltsin,
and between Gerhard Schröder and Vladimir Putin. At the same time, German
Foreign Ministers had little alternative but to cede eastern policy to the
Chancellor’s Office while formulating their own agenda beyond the “Russia first”
approach. For example, during his term in office, Joschka Fischer placed a strong
focus on conflict management in the Balkans. Other Foreign Office policies, such
as an emphasis on developing a new European neighborhood policy, have sought
to take a more differentiated approach toward Eastern Europe as a means of coun-
terbalancing the “Russia first” strategy. Other initiatives include “The Role of the
European Union with 25 and More Members in the 21st Century,”a joint effort of
the German and Polish Policy Planning Staffs.5 Under the guidance of Policy
Planning Staff directors Georg Clemens Dick and Piotr Switalski, German and
Polish policymakers proposed a common foreign policy agenda for the enlarged
EU that encompassed a new neighborhood policy, transatlantic relations, and the
EU’s impact on globalization. Even before the European Council declared its inten-
tion in November 2002 to elaborate a new neighborhood policy, the Polish-
German initiative had already outlined the initial objectives.6 The document 
Economic interests
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designated Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Russia as neighborhood countries. By
including Russia, Polish and German policy planners sought to maintain the
strategic balance in Europe while avoiding the threat of new dividing lines. In prac-
tical terms, the initiative suggested that the enlarged EU take a differentiated
approach to its new neighbors based on their varying levels of transition, and pro-
posed a broad range of policies based on functional cooperation. For example,
institutional linkages between the enlarged EU and its neighbors should be based
on broadening the European Economic Area. Another example of Germany’s 
effort to create an institutional framework for a new Ostpolitik involved the co-
operation between France, Germany and Poland within the Weimar Triangle. Even
though the Weimar Triangle has decreased in importance, its potential for revitali-
zation in the future should not be dismissed. While Germany had a substantial
impact on EU eastern enlargement, one must ask how Berlin is asserting its 
interests in the face of new challenges posed by neighborhood relations, such as
guiding democratic transitions in post-Soviet states and shaping the overlapping
integration spaces between the EU and the Russian Federation.
To assess the potential future directions of German Ostpolitik, it is useful to look
at the lobby groups that are pushing this issue forward. Ever since Gorbachev’s
term in office, German Ostpolitik has been influenced by economic interests. Some
of the most influential actors of the German energy sector and German banks are
affiliated with lobby groups such as the Committee on Eastern European Economic
Relations (Ostausschuss der deutschen Wirtschaft) with representatives in
Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad and Novosibirsk, the German-Russian Forum,
and the German-Ukrainian Forum. All of these institutions are committed to pro-
moting German Ostpolitik, but their priorities are focused much more on promo-
ting trade relations and a favorable investment climate rather than on strategy
development. The same assessment applies to actors promoting civil society rela-
tions with Eastern Europe. Guided by interests of historical reconciliation and
grass-roots contacts, these groups make important contributions to intercultural
understanding and exchange, but their impact on future-oriented strategies is
limited.
Altogether, Germany’s wide-ranging experiences, interests, and actors make it the
clear leader among the old EU member states in developing policies toward
Eastern Europe. In addition, Germany’s geographic location, directly bordering a
number of new EU member states in Central Europe, puts it in a crucial position
to shape the new agenda of structuring the overlapping integration spaces 
between the EU’s new neighborhood and Russia’s old neighborhood. At the same
time, Germany’s Eastern policy forms only one part of the country’s overall foreign
relations, and other priorities might increase once a new government takes power
in late 2005. While it is still too early to firmly predict the contours of the new
government’s foreign policy, it is important to consider how the outcome of
Germany’s recent elections, as well as certain domestic political priorities, will
affect Germany’s Eastern policy in the near future.
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Germany and the
Orange Revolution
2. What to Expect from the New German Government in Terms of
Eastern Policy 
2.1. Ukraine as signpost toward a European neighborhood policy and beyond
Certain key events and factors provide important indications as to what one can
expect from the new German Government in terms of Eastern Policy. These inclu-
de: Germany’s reaction to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the recent visa scan-
dal, the September 2005 national elections, and the issue of Turkey’s potential
membership in the EU.
In autumn 2004, the Western world – including Germany – was surprised by the
Orange Revolution in Ukraine. A democratic opposition movement driven by
Western democratic values suddenly fulfilled longtime Western demands that had
hindered Ukraine from becoming a part of European institutions. Suddenly, when
policymakers in Berlin, Paris, or London were asked about Ukraine’s prospects for
joining the EU and other Euro-Atlantic institutions, references to Ukraine’s
un-civil society and the lack of democracy were not sufficient to justify a negative
answer. In light of the new strategic challenges coming from Kiev, the German
Bundestag on 1 December 2004 conducted a debate on “Strengthening Democracy
in Ukraine.”7 All of the speakers – including representatives from both the former
ruling coalition as well as the opposition – tended to highlight three main themes.
First, speakers insisted that elections must take place according to Western demo-
cratic standards. Second, some parliamentarians, such as Angel Merkel and
Claudia Nolte of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and Gernot Erler of the
Social Democratic Party (SPD), argued in terms of a “European framework,” i.e.,
that domestic policy developments in Ukraine needed to be oriented toward
European values, that crisis management should be conducted under the aegis of
EU representatives, and that European decision-makers needed to provide a posi-
tive signal regarding the integration of Ukraine into European structures. With
regard to the European Neighborhood policy, Claudia Nolte argued that the con-
cept contains only a limited, and therefore insufficient, openness toward Ukraine.
Third, the parliamentary debate focused in Russia. Most of the speakers, among
them Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, highlighted Russia’s position in connection
with the Ukrainian election crisis. From this perspective, the crisis in Ukraine
would be impossible to resolve without Moscow’s support (Schröder ultimately did
use his good personal relations with Putin, calling his friend in the Kremlin twice
to underscore the importance of finding a peaceful and democratic solution of the
Ukrainian crisis.)8 This parliamentary debate was preceded by two resolutions. On
21 October, before the first round of the presidential election, the German
Bundestag urged the Ukrainian government to hold free and fair elections, empha-
sizing their importance both for Ukraine’s future as well as its relations to Russia
and the European Union.9 After the second round, during which obvious falsifica-
tions were exposed to an international public, Bundestag members from all parties
supported a petition criticizing the outcome of the elections and demanding free
and fair elections according to OSCE standards.10
These debates and petitions within the German Bundestag shed light on the deve-
lopment of a new Ostpolitik. Berlin highly appreciated the relevance of the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine, as it pushed the Ukrainian question higher on both the
European and Russian agendas. However, most statements emerging from
International reactions to
the Orange Revolution
A European perspective
for Ukraine
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Germany failed to transcend the existing policy framework. In comparison, the
U.S. favored a “carrots and sticks” approach, while Poland emphasized a Euro-
Atlantic perspective for Ukraine. U.S. Congressman Dana Rohrabacher submitted
a bill entitled “Ukraine Democracy and Fair Elections Act of 2004”. The bill called
on President Kuchma and Prime Minister Yanukovych to “stop overt, flagrant and
inadmissible violations of Ukraine’s human rights commitments to the OSCE, and
guarantee respect for fundamental democratic liberties”. The act proposed sanc-
tions if the violations of standards listed in the bill continued. Such sanctions
included barring top officials of the Ukrainian government and their family mem-
bers from entering U.S. territory. Other threatened restrictions against Ukrainian
officials included the confiscation of their property in the United States, blocking
their bank accounts, seizing the funds in these accounts, and banning loans to
Ukrainian officials.11 In contrast, the resolution adopted by the Polish Sejm calling
for free and transparent elections in Ukraine, was much more positive than the
American and German positions. Instead of criticizing media restrictions or the
unfair election campaign in Ukraine, Poland’s statement expressed support for
Ukraine’s future in the EU and NATO.12
While most German declarations on Ukraine reflected the existing European
neighborhood policy that demanded democracy in Ukraine avoided concrete com-
mitments on Ukrainian membership within Euro-Atlantic institutions, individual
German policymakers did seek to initiate a new debate. One of the most promi-
nent contributions was Wolfgang Schäuble’s position on the future of European
integration.13
Underscoring Ukraine’s history, culture and geographic position, he argued that
Ukraine – and under certain conditions Moldova and Belarus – should be offered
a “European perspective.” Schäuble stated further that European policymakers
would miss a crucial opportunity to have a positive impact on the future of
European integration if they failed to take advantage of the current situation.
Unfortunately, however, Germany’s domestic agenda, together with the escalation
of the “visa scandal” in late 2004, hindered the formulation of additional forward-
looking positions that, like Schäuble’s, could add dynamism to Germany’s general
encouragement of democratic transitions in Ukraine and other countries of the
former Soviet Union. The visa affair arose as a result of a new German visa policy
instituted by Minister of State Ludger Volmer, a member of the Green Party, who
discarded essential safeguards against abuses such as illegal migration and human
trafficking in order to speed up the process for issuing tourist visas. The contro-
versy prompted Volmer’s resignation from his roles in the Bundestag's Foreign
Affairs Committee and as foreign affairs spokesperson for the Green Party, and it
severely damaged the reputation of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. Pressure
from opposition political parties, particularly the CDU and CSU, ultimately forced
the creation of a parliamentary Commission of Inquiry to examine the visa affair.14
The visa “scandal”not only raised negative images of Ukraine as a source of illegal
migration but also put a damper on the euphoria following the Orange Revolution,
thereby negatively influencing that part of the German political elite who might
otherwise have provided more forceful support to Ukraine’s efforts to join the EU
and NATO.
The EU’s new neighborhood was a foreign policy issue during the recent German
national elections in September 2005. The foreign policy issues addressed in
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political party platforms were not limited to Ukraine but also included the future
shape of the European Union in general, and Turkey’s EU candidacy in particular.
For example, the CDU/CSU advocated a more restrictive approach toward future
EU enlargement and placed a stronger emphasis on domestic policy priorities.
From this perspective, if the EU’s eastern neighbors sought to join European insti-
tutions, they would first need to carry out democratic transitions as a necessary
prerequisite. From the opposite perspective, one might argue that, to a certain
extent, it is precisely the prospect of joining European institutions that serves as
the most important driving force for democratic and market-oriented transitions;
without a European perspective, such countries are likely to implement Western
values only to a limited extent.15 Consequently, the Christian Democrats did not
advocate EU membership for Turkey but rather favored a “privileged partnership,”
short of full membership, with Ankara.16
In contrast, the Social Democrats emphasized the importance of supporting demo-
cracy, freedom, and liberty beyond EU borders.17 The SPD has expressed its sup-
port for good relations with the EU’s neighbors in general, and meeting European
obligations toward Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria in particular. The Green Party
platform adopted a similar position, postulating a responsible partnership with the
EU’s neighbors and keeping the door of European integration as open as possi-
ble.18 Of all the EU’s direct neighbors, Ukraine has initiated the most far-reaching
changes toward democracy and European values. As a result, the Orange
Revolution poses a particular challenge to German elites and German society in
general to place a higher priority on German-Ukrainian relations.
While Ukraine provides an example of the spread of European values, the lack of
democracy in other countries, particularly Belarus, confronts European decision-
makers with the challenge to guarantee stability and security beyond the EU’s
borders. There is a strong political lobby in Berlin directed toward Belarus, both in
terms of seeking historical reconciliation for the destruction of World War II as well
as promoting future democratic structures. Within the Bundestag, the Belarusian
agenda has been supported by members of the CDU (Claudia Nolte), the SPD (Ute
Zapf, Gernot Erler), and other parties. Prior to Belarusian elections in 2000 and
2004, the Bundestag adopted resolutions demanding free and fair elections 
according to OSCE standards.19 Aside from criticizing the authoritarian regime,
demanding democratic values, and supporting civil society, these resolutions took
no further actions. The ongoing human rights violations in Belarus have also led
Bundestag members to issue statements of solidarity with victims of the autho-
ritarian regime.20
German-Belarusian relations are also characterized by grass-roots cooperation.
About 800 German NGOs are engaged in a wide range of activities in Belarus,
including charity, historical memory and reconciliation, city partnerships, technical
assistance, youth exchanges, etc.21 Very often German interest in grass-roots 
activities is much higher than what the authoritarian regime of President
Lukashenka will tolerate, and activities are obstructed by administrative chicanery
of all kinds, such as the denial of visas or entrance into Belarus.
Sine 1997, the “Minsk Forum,” organized annually by the German Embassy in
Minsk in cooperation with the German-Belarusian society and supported by
numerous other donors, serves as a meeting point for the German lobby for
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Belarus where a broad variety of issues concerning Belarusian domestic develop-
ment and international cooperation are discussed.22 
In 2005 the German international broadcaster Deutsche Welle announced its plans
to launch an information program for Belarus called the “Belarusian Chronicle.”
The European Commission has awarded a 12-month grant of 138,000 Euros,
starting 1 November 2005, to this project. The broadcast’s overall objective is to
increase the Belarusian public’s awareness of democracy, pluralism, the rule of law,
freedom of the press, and human rights.23 The Belarusian opposition criticized the
initial decision to run the program primarily in Russian, arguing that the German
decision lacked the necessary empathy for the culture and political relevance of
Belarusian language.24
Moldova, another focal point of European neighborhood policy, is culturally, histo-
rically and geographically less related to Germany than Belarus and Ukraine.
Nevertheless, some German policymakers, such as Michael Zickerick, the former
German ambassador to Moldova, and Bodo Hombach, the former Special
Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, have expressed support for
the integration of the Republic of Moldova into European institutions. The strate-
gy of German elites toward Moldova is framed primarily within the European
agenda rather than focusing on strengthening bilateral relations, even though the
German embassy is one of the few Western diplomatic representations in
Chisinau25. All in all, Moldova has never been a high priority within Germany’s
Eastern policy, and further German engagement depends strongly on individual
advocates such as Zickerick or Hombach.
Due to its historical obligations, economic interests and geographic position,
Germany has a strong tradition in shaping Eastern policy, including Willy Brandt’s
approach toward reconciliation, support for Gorbachev’s concept of a common
European house, and the promotion of EU eastern enlargement. The latest
challenges, such as the Orange Revolution or Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime,
have been addressed in parliamentary debates and pronouncements made during
the 2005 German elections, thereby indicating Berlin’s sensitivity for these issues.
The German agenda is focused on supporting democratic developments, western
values, and a European orientation within Eastern European states.
So far, however, German policy represents a “wait and see”approach and, to a large
extent, does not offer far-reaching visions or solutions regarding the future of EU
Eastern enlargement, the geographic limits of the EU, or alternative institutional
prospects for democratic newcomers such as Ukraine – and potentially Belarus –
within the European architecture. The new German Government, a grand coalition
between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, incorporates both approaches, i.e., both
restrictive and open positions regarding EU eastern enlargement. The current lack
of forward-looking foreign policy proposals is being filled in to some extent by
policy planners, German political foundations, and other actors who have
elaborated proposals beyond current Brussels policy. From a critical perspective,
more German policymakers and experts appear to be focused on promoting demo-
cracy in Belarus rather than offering Ukraine sustainable commitments toward
integration within European institutions. In addition, due to the difficulties
encountered in promoting Turkey’s EU candidacy as well as the current constitu-
tional and budgetary crises confronting the EU, Germany appears unwilling to
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Russian relations
Criticism from Central Europe
adopt the Polish position that seeks to offer Ukraine the prospect of future EU
accession.
2.2. The “Russia first” approach and beyond 
German Eastern policy has traditionally been characterized by a “Russia first”
approach. Gerhard Schröder has continued to personalize German-Russian rela-
tions at the highest level by placing a high priority on bilateral relations with
Russian President Vladimir Putin. Accordingly, the German-Russian agenda has
been largely interest-driven rather than value-driven. First and foremost, Schröder
has acted to promote German economic interests; other issues of common
German-Russian interest include the formation of a strategic axis during the Iraq
conflict and certain socio-cultural initiatives. By referring to Putin as a “democrat
through and through” (“lupenreiner Demokrat”) and demanding that the West
take a more differentiated view of Russia’s Chechnya policy, Schröder not only
avoided criticism of Putin but also rejected a more value-oriented approach to EU-
Russian relations. The bilateral German-Russian agenda became a particular 
problem after eight Central and Eastern European nations joined the EU in May
2004. Poland and the Baltic states have been very sensitive to unilateral German
policy initiatives. From the perspective of Warsaw, Riga, Vilnius or Tallinn, EU-
Russian relations must be framed within a common European strategy. From a
Central European perspective,“axis-building”between Berlin, Paris, and Moscow is
associated with traumatic historic experiences of a Zwischeneuropa. The new EU
member states therefore strongly advocate the Europeanization of relations with
the Russian Federation.
In 2005, two occurrences were particularly representative of the character of
German-Russian bilateral relations: the celebration of 750th anniversary of
Kaliningrad, and negotiations to construct a Russian-German gas pipeline under
the Baltic Sea that bypasses Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltic states. On 3 July, Putin
hosted French President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder in Kaliningrad to cele-
brate the 750th anniversary of the city. At the same time, Russia did not invite the
two new EU members that are direct neighbors of the Russian exclave, Lithuania
and Poland. Alexander Kwasniewski and Valdas Adamkus, the presidents of these
countries, interpreted this as a deliberate diplomatic snub that reflected the in-
creasingly difficult relations between Russia and Central European countries.26 On
8 September, directly prior to the German elections, Putin paid a one-day visit to
Berlin. Schröder and Putin were present when the Russian state-owned energy
giant Gazprom signed an agreement with E.ON and BASF on a new pipeline 
project connecting the Russian city of Vyborg to Greifswald in northern Germany.
In addition to promoting the German-Russian energy partnership, and once again
demonstrating the priority of interests over values, Putin’s visit to Berlin signaled
his personal support of Schröder in the elections one week later. The strongest 
criticisms of these developments have emerged from Poland and Lithuania. Both
countries consider the pipeline agreement a violation of their strategic interests.
The Baltic states are still resistant to bilateral German-Russian policy initiatives, as
they call to mind the Soviet annexation that resulted from the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939. In addition to these parti-
cular legacies of the past, Central European states are concerned about reduced
energy transit revenues. The Russian-German pipeline has damaged these coun-
tries’ trust that relations with Russia will be conducted within a European frame-
Beyond the personalized and
interest-driven German-
Russian relations
Prospects of the German-
Russian relations
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work. The issue overshadowed the visit of Lithuanian President Adamkus to Berlin
on 25 October.
Adamkus underscored his criticism that Schröder’s bilateral approach toward
Russia ignored the strategic interests of other EU member states, and he also
expressed a certain optimism that designated chancellor Angel Merkel will show
greater understanding for Lithuania’s particular interests with regard to European-
Russian relations.27
To what extent might the designated German government change the most 
criticized areas of German-Russian relations, i.e., the high level of personalization,
the lack of emphasis on democratic values, the bilateral policy initiatives that vio-
late the interests of other EU member states, and the “Russia first”approach? The
following paragraphs will explore this question in greater detail.
During their election campaigns, all German political parties adopted positions on
the importance of German-Russian relations. The CDU advocated good relations
with Moscow but at the same time indicated potential changes in policy. The
Christian Democrats argued that the personal friendship between the Kremlin and
Berlin should be more embedded within transatlantic relations, should consider
the interests of Central European states, and should more strongly emphasize
developments in Russian domestic policy.28 Similarly, the Green Party
recommended a Russian-German dialogue oriented toward democratic standards,
human rights, and finding a solution to the situation in Chechnya. The Green Party
platform also underscores the importance of responsible relations with Germany’s
Central European neighbors.29 In their foreign policy program, the Liberal
Democrats (FDP) supported close political, economic, and cultural cooperation
with Russia.30 In addition, the FDP argued that contacts with civil society repre-
sentatives should be increased. The FDP also adopted a critical tone with regard to
violations of press and media freedoms; the weakness of democratic structures in
general; and the need for the Russian government to develop a political solution
to the Chechnya conflict. The SPD party platform largely neglected the issue of
relations with Russia, but did argue for good relations with Russia within a
European context.31 
To gain an idea of the potential direction of German foreign policy under the 
designated Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, one can refer to a public 
statement that the then-Minister of State gave at the German Institute for
International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) on 21
September. He directed a relatively significant amount of attention to Russian-
German relations, particularly with regard to common economic, political, energy,
and security interests.32 By emphasizing joint German-Russian interests and prai-
sing the significance of Baltic Sea pipeline for bilateral relations, Steinmeier
neglected the challenges and risks of violating Polish and Lithuanian interests.
Certainly, it is too early to make predictions regarding the future Russian policy of
the German Foreign Office as well as the division of foreign policy competencies
between designated Chancellor Merkel and the new Foreign Minister. As far as
Merkel is concerned, potential policy shifts toward Russia will more likely affect
the style and not the substance of relations.33 In terms of substance, Merkel’s
approach toward relations with Russia will depend on the extent to which she
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Interests versus values
emphasizes Russian domestic developments and a European policy framework
that takes the particular interests of Central European and Baltic states into consi-
deration. As far as the personal character of relations is concerned, a Putin-Merkel
friendship might be positively influenced by Merkel’s knowledge of Russian,
Merkel’s gender will likely prevent the establishment of an “old boys’ network.”
Future German policy toward Russia also depends significantly on the division of
foreign policy competencies between the Chancellor’s Office and the Foreign
Office, and the determination as to which of these offices will be the driving force
behind relations with Russia. If Steinmeier favors policy continuity characterized
by the prioritization of German economic interests, Merkel may find it difficult to
formulate a new Russian agenda, or she might simply be less interested in Moscow
than was Gerhard Schröder.
3. The Future Trajectory of Germany’s Eastern Policy 
Germany, a traditional leader in the formulation of policy toward Eastern Europe,
confronts the challenge of developing and implementing a new Ostpolitik that
takes into account both the recent changes inside the region as well as the crisis of
European integration following the French and Dutch constitutional referenda. At
this time, before a new German government has actually taken office, it remains
too early to give reliable predictions on the future direction of German Eastern
policy. The coalition treaty signed between the Christian Democrats and the Social
Democrats on 11 November 2005 mentions a broad spectrum of foreign policy
goals relating to Eastern Europe. The treaty declares that relations with Russia
should be based not only on common interests but also on common values and
should be conducted on both the bilateral and European levels. Supporting
Ukraine on its way to Europe is formulated as another priority. By highlighting
these foreign policy priorities, the designated German government has indicated
the importance it attaches to these issues. At the same time, however, the coalition
treaty contains contradictory priorities with regard to Eastern Europe and fails to
formulate a long-term strategy.34 Nevertheless, both external pressures as well as
debates within the German foreign policy elite point to the future priorities and
strategies of German Ostpolitik.
3.1. German-Russian Relations: Europeanization, depersonalization and
value-orientation
Russia’s position within the region is too important to neglect. During the rainbow
revolutions, it became obvious that the Kremlin’s influence inside the region 
requires some reassessment. Germany’s strategic goal, at the bilateral and particu-
larly at the European level, should be to take Russia seriously by inclusion while
pointing out the basic conditions for cooperation. The current interest-driven
approach should be complemented by value-driven cooperation. In light of current
developments in Russian domestic politics, such value-driven cooperation should
pay particular attention to strengthening the separation of powers. The forth-
coming re-negotiation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which
forms the legal basis for relations between Russia and the European Union and
which expires in 2007 during the Finnish and German EU presidencies, will 
provide an occasion to identify not only new strategies but also a new style of
mutual relations.
Driving forces of
a new Ostpolitik
Strategic approach of
a multi-level Europe
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Aside from assuming leadership in the Europeanization of policy toward Russia,
Germany must also pursue good relations with Moscow while respecting the
interests of Central European states. In practical terms, the conduct and content of
future German-Russian relations will also depend on the domestic division of
power between Steinmeier and Merkel, and the extent to which leading German
policymakers choose to go beyond personal relations with Putin.
3.2. Shaping the structure of overlapping integration spaces 
The rainbow revolutions in Ukraine and other countries of the former Soviet
Union, combined with the internal crisis of European integration, have opened up
a new strategic landscape. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution once again demonstrated
Putin’s failure to influence the post-Soviet integration space through personal net-
works, direct pressure, and economic dependency. At the same time, Russia
remains an important actor in Europe as a whole. For the first time, Russia and the
EU face the common challenge of shaping overlapping integration spaces. For its
part, Western strategy must take Russia seriously, including it in decision-making
processes while pointing out the basic conditions for cooperation. In turn, Russia
should develop long-term cooperative strategies that uphold democratic principles
and that are attractive to the West.
So far, it is the new EU member states, particularly Poland, Lithuania, and Slovakia,
who have provided the momentum in developing and implementing a new
Ostpolitik. But transcending the EU’s current, limited to neighborhood policy
requires the support of at least one of the main “old”EU member states. Given its
foreign policy traditions, experiences, and interests, Germany is optimally
positioned to promote new strategic alliances with other EU member states. Based
on new alliances and forms of collaboration, a new Ostpolitik would strive to 
identify both the geographic future of Europe as well as additional forms of 
functional and institutional integration. A Ukrainian leap toward Europe would
have far-reaching consequences, not only for Kiev but also for the European
Union. Such a development would immediately make the EU a truly pan-
European actor. Along the way, the EU will also have to answer a number of 
questions in the medium term: How will the EU close the gap between the 
accession of Turkey and other potential member states and its need to maintain
manageable decision-making and governance structures? How can the EU 
successfully stabilize the crisis-ridden countries of the Balkans? How can demo-
cracy be supported and solidified over the long term in Belarus or the Black Sea
region, which includes Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan?
To be able to meet these challenges, the architects of a new Ostpolitik need to
develop strategies for a multi-level Europe. In the future, the EU cannot allow 
territorial overextension obstruct its ability to act effectively. On the other hand, it
will be equally important to be able to guarantee security and stability on the 
continent. In these efforts, it is worth considering forms of association comprising
varying degrees of integration, or partial memberships in individual areas of
European cooperation. Both the Schengen Agreement and the European Economic
Area already provide examples of institutional arrangements in which not every
EU member state participates in every area of integration.
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3.3. From authoritarian regimes toward western values
Despite their geographic proximity, Belarus differs fundamentally from Ukraine.
While President Lukashenka has succeeded in consolidating his authoritarian
regime, free and fair elections initiated a regime change in Ukraine. A new
Ostpolitik will certain to fail if it does not take the different domestic situations of
Eastern European countries into account. Key segments of the foreign policy 
establishments in Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Germany place a high priority
on democratic transition in Belarus.Yet regime change cannot simply be supported
from outside; rather, it must be initiated by a democratic opposition. National 
elites, Western governments, and the Kremlin cannot take authoritarian regimes in
Eastern Europe for granted. At the same time, the latest developments in Ukraine
exemplify the problems of sustainable regime change toward democracy and a
market economy. Therefore, the advancement of democracy must form an 
important pillar of a new Ostpolitik. To identify and support shifts toward demo-
cracy, a new Eastern policy should differentiate East European countries according
to their orientation toward Western values. In addition to assessing developments
at the governmental level, policymakers and experts need to pay attention to a
broad spectrum of actors, particularly democratic opposition movements.
3.4. Actors and driving forces of a new Ostpolitik
Due to its historical background, economic interests and geographic proximity,
Germany will be the center of gravity for a new Ostpolitik. In addition, new EU
member states – particularly Poland and Slovakia – are committed to the develop-
ment of an active Eastern policy due to their geographic proximity, their common
experiences of post-socialist political and economic transition, their well-
developed networks, and their common interest in establishing stable relations
with Russia. Beyond their own specific regional interests, however, these new
member states will need to find additional coalition partners to push this policy
forward.
Russia’s position within the region is too important to neglect. During the rainbow
revolutions it became obvious that the Kremlin’s influence inside the region 
requires some reassessment. Western policymakers must take Russia seriously,
including it in decision-making processes while pointing out the basic conditions
for cooperation. Russia’s agenda is to increase democratic principles of it’s foreign
relations. A new Ostpolitik is part of the transatlantic agenda and should be 
treated as such. Issues that possess particular potential for joint action include the
support of democratic transitions in Eastern Europe as well as the assessment,
management, and resolution of regional conflicts. From an institutional perspec-
tive, fast-track NATO membership has been discussed for countries such as
Ukraine. In general, new strategies cannot be driven solely by national govern-
ments and European institutions, but must also be advanced from the bottom up
by civil society. This precondition derives from the decisive role that civil society
actors have played in the velvet and rainbow revolutions in Eastern Europe since
1989.
Kempe · From a European Neighborhood Policy toward a New Ostpolitik
C·A·P Policy Analysis · 3 · 2006 Page 17
Notes
1) Stephan Bierling, 1998, Wirtschaftshilfe für Moskau: Motive und Strategien der Bundesrepublik und der
USA 1990 – 1996. Paderborn, p. 324.
2) Bierling, pp. 317f.
3) Federal Ministry of Economics and Labor, Aussenwirtschaft und Europa, http://www.bmwa.bund.de
(downloaded 19 January 2005); Cologne Institute for Economic Research, Deutschland in Zahlen 2005, p.
41.
4) Federal Statistical Office, 2004. Order of Rank of Germany’s Trading Partners 2004. Wiesbaden.
5) Auswärtiges Amt/Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Die Rolle der EU mit 25 und mehr Mitgliedern im
21. Jahrhundert. Beiträge für eine neue Weltordnung. Gemeinsame deutsch-polnische Studien (Juni 2001
– Mai 2003) Berlin/Warsaw 2003. https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/
pdf/eu/dt-pl-studie.pdf
6) General Affairs and External Relations Council, New Neighbours Initiative. 18 November 2002.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/gac.htm#ceeca181102 (downloaded 28 November
2002). Neue Nachbarschaften, neue Partnerschaften einer nach Osten erweiterten EU. Konzeptioneller
Rahmen für eine östliche Dimension. In: Die Rolle der EU mit 25 und mehr Mitgliedern im 21. Jahrhundert.
Beiträge für eine neue Weltordnung. Gemeinsame deutsch-polnische Studien, pp. 35-40.
7) Die Demokratie in der Ukraine festigen. 1 December 2004. German Bundestag debate. Berlin,.
8) Gernot Erler, 2005. Russland kommt. Putins Staat – der Kampf um Macht und Modernisierung. Freiburg:
p. 141.
9) German Bundestag, Ukraine zu freien and fairen Wahlen unter internationaler Beobachtung drängen. 21
October 2004. http://www.bundestag.de/bic/hib/2004/2004_252/03.html, downloaded 10 November 2005.
10) Resolution of the SPD, CDU/CSU, Alliance 90/The Greens and FDP party fractions,“Fälschungen der
ukrainischen Präsidentschaftswahlen,” German Bundestag, 24 November 2004. http://dip.bundestag.de/
btd/15/042/1504265.pdf, downloaded 10 November 2005.
11) America’s Final Warning. 18-24 September 2004. Zerkalo Nedeli, No. 37 (5112).
12) Seym Polshtche zaklinayv ukrainsky vlady provesti tchesni vibori. Pro Europe, Oct. 22, 2004,
http://www.proeuropa.info/news/?id=843&PHPSESSID=4e1dcd730b379cc1d0b1e58cd2e31eeb, downloa-
ded 25 October 2004.
13) Wolfgang Schäuble, 27 January 2005. Die europäische Integration voranbringen. IN: Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung.
14) Große Anfrage der CDU/CSU mit Antwort der Bundesregierung. http://dip.bundestag.de/
btd/15/036/1503670.pdf
15) Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003. 2004. Gütersloh. p. 152.
16) Deutschlands Chancen nutzen. Wachstum. Arbeit. Sicherheit. CDU/CSU Party Platform.
http://www.regierungsprogramm.cdu.de/download/regierungsprogramm-05-09-cducsu.pdf
17) Deutschlands Rolle in Europa und der Welt. Die Programmdebatte der SPD. 23 March 2005. Draft Party
Program 
18) Eins für Alle. Das Grüne Wahlprogramm 2005. Alliance 90/The Greens Party Platform.
http://www.gruene-portal.de/userspace/gruene.de/PDFs/Wahlprogramm_2005.pdf.
19) Resolution, 29 September 2004 . Belarus vor den Parlamentswahlen und dem Referendum, German
Bundestag, Printed Document 3811.
Resolution of the SPD, CDU/CSU, Alliance 90/The Greens and FDP party fractions. Wahlen in Belarus. 11
October 2000. German Bundestag, Printed Document 14/4252.
20) Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Irmgard Karwatzki, Hermann
Gröhe, Dr. Friedbert Pflüger, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU. 5 March 2004.
Menschenrechte in der Republik Belarus. German Bundestag, Printed Document 15/2638.
Pressemitteilung der MdB Claudia Nolte, Bundesministerin a.D., Berichterstatterin der CDU/CSU-
Reaktion des Deutschen Bundestages. 1 June 2005. Zum Urteil gegen die belarussischen Politiker Nikolai
Statkiewitsch und Pawel Severinets,. http://www.germanembassy.org.by/ de/informationen/ PM_von_
MdB_Claudia_Nolte.html
21) 10 Jahre Deutsch-Belarussische Beziehungen. Eine Bilanz. 2004. German Embassy in Belarus/German
Foreign Office, 2nd edition, Berlin/Minsk.
22) http://minsk-forum.dbg-online.org/index.html
23) European Union. 24 August 2005. Commission to support independent broadcasting in Belarus.
IP/05/1063, Brussels 
24) Jan Maksymiuk. 21 August 2005. Belarus: The German Broadcaster makes Waves with Russian
Language Plan. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
Page 18 C·A·P Policy Analysis · 3 · 2006
Kempe · From a European Neighborhood Policy toward a New Ostpolitik
25) Resolution of the SPD, CDU/CSU, Alliance 90/The Greens and FDP party fractions. 5 May 2004. Den
Weg zur Einheit und Demokratisierung in der Republik Moldau unterstützen. German Bundestag, Printed
Document 15/3052.
26) Valentinas Mite. 3 July 2005. Russia: Putin Meets German, French Leaders in Kaliningrad, Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty.
27) Adamkus bekräftigt Kritik an Schröder. Litauischer Präsident will Merkel ‘Vertrauensvorschuss’ geben.
26 October 2005 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Robert von Lucius, Von der Ostsee bis zum Schwarzen
Meer. Unbehagen in Vilnius vor dem Deutschland-Besuch des Litauischen Präsidenten Adamkus. 25
October 2005. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. p. 12.
28) Deutschlands Chancen nutzen. Wachstum. Arbeit. Sicherheit. CDU/CSU Party Platform,
http://www.regierungsprogramm.cdu.de/download/regierungsprogramm-05-09-cducsu.pdf
29) Eins für Alle. Das Grüne Wahlprogramm 2005. Alliance 90/The Greens Party Platform,
http://www.gruene-portal.de/userspace/gruene.de/PDFs/Wahlprogramm_2005.pdf
30) Arbeit hat Vorfahrt. Deutschlandprogramm 2005. FDP Party Platform, http://files.liberale.de/fdp-wahl-
programm.pdf
31) Deutschlands Rolle in Europa und der Welt. Die Programmdebatte der SPD. 23 March 2005. Draft Party
Program.
32) Minister of State Frank-Walter Steinmeier. 21 September 2005. Speech at the German Institute for
International and Security Affairs, Berlin.
33) Andrei Zagorski. September 2005. Russia and Germany: Continuity and Changes. Russie.CEI.Visions
No. 6, ifri Paris.
34) Gemeinsam für Deutschland – mit Mut und Menschlichkeit. 11 November 2005. Coalition Treaty bet-
ween the CDU/CSU and SPD. p. 134.

C·A·P
Center for Applied Policy
Research © 2006
Maria-Theresia-Str. 21
81675 München
Telefon 089 · 2180 1300
Telefax 089 · 2180 1320
E-Mail redaktion@cap-lmu.de
www.cap.lmu.de
